NTSB: Neglect Of Hull, Hatches Led To Crane Barge Sinking In Gulf

Failure to properly maintain and inspect its hull and hatch covers by its owners led to the sinking of the crane barge Ambition, towed by the mv. Karen Koby, in the Gulf of Mexico on June 15, 2022. That was the conclusion of the National Transportation Safety Board in a report released August 24.

The Karen Koby was towing the Ambition when the barge capsized and sank in the Gulf of Mexico, about 48 miles southeast of Cameron, La. There was no one on the barge, and none of the Karen Koby’s four crewmembers were injured. The Ambition was partly submerged in about 54 feet of water, where it was later salvaged. The sunken barge released an estimated 1,980 gallons of oil, causing an oil sheen about 5 miles long and 20 yards wide. The Ambition and its crane were determined to be a total loss, with damages estimated at $6.3 million.

A marine salvage company recovered the Ambition within three months of the casualty. Some of its deck equipment and sections of the crane were also recovered. The wreckage of both barges, separated during recovery, was brought to Amelia, La., for examination and eventual scrapping. Investigators from the Coast Guard and the NTSB examined the wreckage on September 29, 2022.

The 195- by 70-foot crane barge was constructed of welded steel, with two spuds on the port side. It had a depth of 10.5 feet, a raked bow and a square stern. Owned by Rigid Constructors, the barge was purpose-built by Diamond “B” Industries of New Iberia, La., to accommodate a crane by welding together two existing deck barges. It was delivered to Rigid Constructors in June 2020. The port barge, GD 962, was constructed in 1995, and the starboard barge, GD 983, was constructed in 1998. Each of the barges, purchased by Rigid in March and April 2020, had one longitudinal watertight bulkhead that ran from the rake void bulkhead to the stern void, along with five transverse watertight bulkheads.

The Karen Koby’s crew consisted of a captain, a mate and two deckhands. A Rigid Constructors crew of five was sent to the Ambition to “secure everything” for its transit. At about 10:20, the Karen Koby got underway with the Ambition on its starboard hip for the 19-mile trip down the Calcasieu River to a fuel facility at the mouth of the river. While underway, the Rigid crew said they secured all items on the deck of the Ambition using ratchet straps.

Regulations require all vessels of more than 150 gross tons to have a load line certificate, exemption or designation for special service when operating beyond the Boundary Line (12 nautical miles offshore for the Gulf of Mexico). The port and starboard barges that had been welded together to make up the Ambition barge were registered at 573 gross tons each, and the casualty route was more than 12 miles offshore. The investigation disclosed that the Ambition did not have a load line certificate, a load line exemption or a designation for “special service” approved or issued by the Coast Guard. The president of marine operations for Rigid Constructors estimated that the Ambition was towed offshore between 6 and 12 times per year. He was not aware of any requirement for the Ambition to adhere to this regulation, nor was the Coast Guard made aware the vessel was making the transits.

At least six hatches were not covered or secured. Two hatch covers were missing. Rigid crewmembers put a pump over one hatch and a steel plate over the other. Two hatches had their covers laid over water suction hoses leading into the compartments below, and two hatch covers were not properly secured and fell off after the barge capsized.

The president of marine operations for Rigid Constructors told investigators that there was no planned maintenance or inspections for the Ambition’s hull. Maintenance was carried out on an “as-needed basis.” Rigid was not able to provide documentation related to any work, preventative maintenance, condition or valuation surveys or repairs carried out on the barge Ambition since its delivery from the shipyard. Further, the president of marine operations told investigators there were no policies or procedures related to the operation, inspection, maintenance or preparation of the company crane barges. There were no company, third party or Coast Guard inspections carried out on the Ambition from the time of delivery to Rigid Constructors from the shipyard, nor were any required.

Postcasualty examination of the port barge found a 25-foot-long separation along the weld seam between the bottom plate and bilge knuckle plate with both plates exhibiting severely wasted steel, which was not consistent with other damage related to the salvage and recovery. At some point, a temporary repair, which consisted of steel plates welded to the floor and knuckle plating, forming a box inside compartment No. 1S, had been made to the area around the separation, to contain water ingress.

Three soft patches with strongback-type bolts, typically used for temporary repairs, were found along the failed seam. However, the separation had grown aft, beyond the steel box, likely due to it being in an area known to be subject to longitudinal stress. The corrosive deterioration of the bottom and bilge knuckle plating and their separation along their weld seam would have allowed water to enter compartment No. 1S of the port barge, which was the likely origin of initial water ingress, the NTSB said.

NTSB investigators found that Rigid Constructors failed to conduct permanent repairs in an area critical to hull strength, and the separation between the bottom plating and the bilge knuckle plating progressed beyond the temporary repair. Rigid Constructors’ lack of hull inspection, maintenance and permanent repairs resulted in the poor hull condition that caused the failure of the hull, the NTSB found.

The report concluded that it is good marine practice for vessel owners to conduct regular oversight and maintenance of hulls, including between drydock periods. An effective maintenance and hull inspection program should proactively address potential steel wastage, identify hull and watertight integrity deficiencies and ensure that corrosion issues are repaired in a timely manner by permanent means.